TAX COURT HOLDS INDIVIDUAL LIABLE FOR ADDITIONS TO TAX, PENALTY FOR DELAY.

Dessa J. Baker-Inman, for respondent.

During 2006 petitioner worked as a consultant for Key Apparel Resources, Ltd. (Key Apparel), and Star of India Fashions, Inc. (Star). Petitioner was paid total compensation of $92,500 for her services to Key Apparel and Star. Also in 2006 Merrill Lynch Bank and Trust Co. made a taxable distribution of $9,166 to petitioner from an IRA. Petitioner was also paid (1) $1,297 in dividends from Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., (2) $15 in dividends from Scottrade, Inc., (3) $31 in interest from Arvest Bank, and (4) an income tax refund of $1,912 from the State of Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration. Petitioner does not dispute having received these payments.³

Petitioner did not file a Federal income tax return for 2006, and she did not make estimated tax payments.⁴ Respondent prepared a substitute for return on petitioner's behalf for 2006 using information reported by third-party payers. See sec. 6020(b)(1). On the basis of that substitute for return, respondent issued to petitioner a notice of deficiency dated January 4, 2010. Attached to the notice of deficiency was Form 4549, Income Tax Examination Changes, on which respondent calculated petitioner's 2006 Federal taxable income as follows:

      Adjustment to Income                                Amount

Second, petitioner argues that the notice of deficiency is invalid because the substitute for return respondent prepared does not comply with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (PRA), Pub. L. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812. Similar arguments concerning the duty to file a tax return and the PRA have been consistently recognized as frivolous. See, e.g., Pitts v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-101; Wolcott v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-315; Dodge v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-236, affd. 317 Fed. Appx. 581 (8th Cir. 2009). We thus reject petitioner's argument that the PRA invalidates her notice of deficiency.

Third, petitioner argues that she is not liable for Federal income tax because the tax laws are incomprehensible to her. While we recognize that the tax laws are complex, we have consistently held that complexity alone does not relieve a taxpayer of his or her duty to file a Federal income tax return and pay any tax determined on that return to be due and owing. See, e.g., Cook v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-137. Petitioner filed a Federal income tax return for 2005, which suggests to us that she was aware of her filing obligation for 2006. Moreover, she earned significant income in 2006, and we believe that she possesses the resources to seek out the advice of a professional tax adviser to aid in her comprehension of the tax laws. Petitioner made no apparent effort to determine her tax liability for 2006, and she cannot now claim harbor from her liability under the pretense that the tax laws are too complex.

Petitioner's remaining arguments are unintelligible shopworn tax-protester rhetoric which we have considered and now reject as baseless. We do not devote any more time to these arguments because to do so might suggest that they have merit. Accord Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417 (5th Cir. 1984).

Gross income includes all income from whatever source derived, unless otherwise specifically excluded. Sec. 61(a). The definition of gross income broadly includes any instance of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayer has complete dominion and control. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). Specifically included in gross income are compensation for services, interest, dividends, and distributions from an IRA. See secs. 61(a)(1), (4), (7), 72(a); see also sec. 402(a). State income tax refunds are also includable in gross income under the "tax benefit rule". See Francisco v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 317, 333-334 (2002), affd. 370 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

On the basis of third-party information, respondent determined that in 2006 petitioner received $92,500 in compensation for services, $31 in interest, $15 in dividends, $9,166 in taxable distributions from an IRA, and an income tax refund of $1,912 from the State of Arkansas. Respondent introduced these information returns at trial and prepared the substitute for return on the basis of those returns. Petitioner has not produced any credible evidence to dispute the receipt of any of the income she received in 2006. Therefore, we sustain respondent's determination that petitioner had $104,921 in unreported income in 2006.

Petitioner received $92,500 in nonemployee compensation in her capacity as a consultant for Key Apparel and Star. Respondent determined the amount of that income from information returns provided by Key Apparel and Star and calculated the amount of self-employment tax and corresponding deduction using Schedule SE, Self-Employment Tax. We agree with respondent's determination that petitioner is liable for self-employment tax on the nonemployee compensation she earned. Accordingly, we hold that amounts Key Apparel and Star paid to petitioner as nonemployee compensation are self-employment income subject to $13,070 of tax as respondent calculated under section 1401. We also hold that petitioner may deduct $6,535 under section 164(f).

Petitioner concedes that she never filed a Form 1040 for 2006.⁶ Respondent has therefore met his burden of production as to the section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax. Petitioner has not offered any credible reason for her failure to file her 2006 return, nor has she produced any evidence to establish the existence of reasonable cause on her part. To the contrary, petitioner's frivolous tax-protester rhetoric leads us to conclude that her failure to file her 2006 return was in fact conscious, intentional, and recklessly indifferent. Therefore, we hold petitioner liable for an addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1).

At trial respondent introduced a copy of the substitute for return which was prepared on behalf of petitioner and certified that the substitute for return was valid under section 6020(b). Respondent also included a copy of the Form 4549 on which petitioner's income tax liability was based and account transcripts which proved that petitioner had no withholdings or estimated tax payments against her 2006 tax liability. Accordingly, we find that respondent produced sufficient evidence that petitioner is liable for an addition to tax under section 6651(a)(2).

Petitioner does not allege that her failure to pay was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect. See sec. 6651(a)(2). Nor did she establish that she exercised ordinary business care or that she would have suffered undue hardship if made to pay her tax liability. See sec. 301.6651-1(c)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs. To the contrary, petitioner appears to have been reckless in her decision not to pay her 2006 taxes even though she earned more than $100,000 that year. Therefore, we hold that petitioner is liable for an addition to tax under section 6651(a)(2).

At trial respondent introduced evidence which proved that petitioner was required to file a Federal income tax return for 2006, that she did not file a 2006 return, and that she did not make any estimated tax payments or have income tax withheld for 2006. That evidence included a copy of petitioner's 2005 Federal income tax return which showed total tax due of $330. The substitute for return which respondent prepared on behalf of petitioner for 2006 showed total tax due of $33,498. Ninety percent of petitioner's 2006 tax liability is $30,148. Thus, petitioner's required annual payment for 2006 was $330; i.e., the lesser of 90 percent of her 2006 tax liability and 100 percent of her 2005 tax liability. Petitioner does not assert, and we do not find, that any of the statutory exceptions in section 6654(e) apply to eliminate petitioner's liability for an addition to tax under section 6654(a). Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is liable for an addition to tax under section 6654 for 2006 based on a required annual payment of $330.⁷

The record is clear that petitioner's positions in this proceeding are frivolous and groundless. Petitioner was warned at trial that she could be sanctioned under section 6673 for asserting frivolous and groundless claims. Petitioner ignored those warnings by maintaining similar frivolous arguments on brief. We therefore believe that sanctions are appropriate. See, e.g., Randall v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-138; Avery v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-60, affd. 399 Fed. Appx. 195 (9th Cir. 2010). Pursuant to section 6673(a)(1), we impose against petitioner a penalty of $3,000.

We have considered all arguments raised by petitioner, and to the extent not discussed herein we conclude that they are irrelevant, moot, or without merit.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered under Rule 155.

² Respondent concedes that the sec. 6654 addition to tax was improperly calculated by determining such addition on the basis of a required annual payment of $30,148. Respondent contends, and we agree, that such an addition should have been calculated on the basis of a required annual payment of $330.

³ We found petitioner's testimony at trial regarding these payments to be evasive. She attempted to avoid answering basic questions on whether she had received that income or stated that she did not know whether she had received that income.

⁴ Petitioner submitted a "Tax Statement" for 2006 which did not comply with the requirements of sec. 6011(a). See sec. 1.6011-1(b), Income Tax Regs.

⁵ At trial, petitioner attempted to introduce numerous documents into evidence which we declined to admit because we found that they were irrelevant, inadmissible hearsay, unable to be authenticated, or some combination thereof. Petitioner also objected on the grounds of hearsay to evidence respondent submitted. We considered all of petitioner's objections and overruled those objections because we found respondent's proffered evidence to be relevant and properly authenticated. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), (8), 902(1), (11).

⁶ The "Tax Statement" petitioner filed in 2006 is not a valid tax return because it consists entirely of zeros and does not contain sufficient information for the Internal Revenue Service to calculate her Federal income tax liability. See United States v. Grabinski, 727 F.2d 681, 687 (8th Cir. 1984); Cabirac v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 163, 169 (2003); Holmes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-31.

⁷ The amount of the sec. 6654 addition to tax is to be determined by the parties in their Rule 155 calculations. See Arnold v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-228.